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INTRODUCTION: ADDING A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE TO AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CLASSES
Albert W. Alschuler*
Twenty-one years ago, John Langbein published a set of teaching materials
titled Comparative Criminal Procedure: Germany.' This book was brief2 and very
readable. Much of it consisted of a popular writer's description of an intriguing
German homicide trial
Langbein's book has been out of print for several years. Before it
disappeared from the bookstores, its author volunteered to prepare an updated
edition, but the West Publishing Company declined his offer. The company
reported that it had not sold enough copies of the first edition to justify a second.
Although the publisher allows law teachers to duplicate Langbein's
materials for their classes (and I still do), the unavailability of up-to-date materials
offering an overview of Continental criminal procedure is sad. It is also a mark of
American provincialism. A comparison of Continental legal systems with our own
not only reveals different ways of resolving issues that all systems have in common;
it also permits students to view their own system from the perspective of a different
paradigm of procedural justice.4
Fortunately, the American Society of Comparative Law agreed in
September 1997 to sponsor a series of pamphlets to better enable law school
Wilson-Dickinson Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977).
2 The book contained 151 pages of materials and 16 pages of appendices.
3 See LANGBEIN, supra note 1, at 13-37 (reproducing SYBILLE BEDFORD, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE: A TRAVELER'S REPORT 103-51 (1961)). Langbein's materials include the official court
documents for the case described by Bedford, and apart from the educational value of these documents,
they make Bedford's astonishing accuracy apparent. Langbein relied on Bedford's journalistic account
because German trials are not stenographically recorded.
4 A physicist who routinely uses Einstein's physics in her research while teaching Newton's
physics in her classes can think in either paradigm, much as a bilingual person can shift from one
language to another. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY OF
JUDGMENT 126-27 (1987). Understanding a legal system other than one's own offers a somewhat
comparable experience.
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teachers to add comparative perspectives to their courses. Edward M. Wise,
director of the Comparative Criminal Law Project at Wayne State, spurred this
development, and the Society has authorized Wise to prepare a pamphlet on
comparative criminal procedure as a pilot project. Richard Frase's contribution to
this symposium describes other ways to add comparative perspective to criminal
law and criminal procedure courses.
I currently teach the Langbein book in the final two or three classes of a
course on the adjudicative phase of American criminal procedure.5 These classes
are easy and fun. They permit a second look at issues considered throughout the
course.
I begin with an opinion poll on the most obvious question, asking students
to suppose that they have been transported to an international community on a space
station orbiting the earth. I tell them that the community is to vote on which
criminal justice system to adopt, the German or the American. Those, I report, are
the only choices. No blending of the two systems is permitted, and England, Libya,
and Iraq failed to make the run-offs. My polls usually have yielded clear (but never
unanimous) results, though occasionally the division of the class has been close.
In my eighteen years of sampling knowledgeable American students, however, the
United States criminal justice system has never prevailed.6
After I have divided the class into two camps and learned where to look for
divergent opinions, students consider the two systems from the perspective of each
of the non-professionals with a role in criminal cases. They begin with an issue on
which William Pizzi and Walter Perron recently wrote the definitive article: Which
system provides better treatment to the victims of crime and to witnesses?7 Even
the heartiest champions of the American system generally give Germany the edge
on this issue. Next, the students consider in which system they would rather be a
juror or lay judge. Finally, they discuss which system they would prefer as a
defendant. As some student always suggests before long, the answer to this
5 At the University of Chicago, I devote two 65-minute classes to the materials. At other law
schools, I have taught the materials in three 50-minute classes. Langbein's materials obviously are rich
enough to justify more extended treatment, but I have been surprised at how much breadth and depth
of coverage even a few classes permit.
6 Unlike Langbein's law review articles, his teaching materials do not grind obvious axes.
Nevertheless, the author's admiration for German criminal justice may show and may color the results
of my polls.
7 See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37 (1996).
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question may turn on whether one is rich or poor or guilty or innocent.8
Under each of these headings, the discussion moves from the lay actor's
perspective to larger issues, and the course ends with an examination of the most
important difference between American and Continental procedure. As William
Pizzi's contribution to this symposium emphasizes, this difference is not
appropriately characterized as the difference between "adversarial" and
"inquisitorial" procedure. Although Americans may describe European justice as
"inquisitorial," Europeans never do. In fact, the Spanish Inquisition ended long ago,
and modem European systems are "mixed." Stated non-polemically, the issue is
what degree of adversariness is appropriate and what independent responsibility for
truth-finding judges should have.
Under this last heading, the class considers how the homicide case upon
which Langbein focuses would be resolved in the United States. Although there is
some room for argument about it, this case might be characterized as one of self-
help justice with strong provocation, an upper-middle-class defendant, and a
dubious defense. All of the American prosecutors with whom I have discussed the
case would have charged the defendant with either first or second degree murder.
Then almost all of them would have accepted a guilty plea to a greatly reduced
charge, perhaps even to a misdemeanor. Many students criticize this seemingly
schizophrenic treatment of the case through American plea bargaining. Many also
doubt that a more adversarial American trial would have focused the issues more
sharply or revealed more of the truth than the German trial. The issue turns out to
be debatable, however. Some students have concluded that the German
prosecutor's insufficiently adversarial approach to the case permitted the defendant
to get away with murder.
In teaching from duplicated copies of an out-of-print book, I feel like a
graybeard who refuses to update or abandon his ancient lecture notes. I do ask
students to include in their course evaluations a line or two about whether I should
continue to assign the book, and the great majority of students have been
enthusiastic.
Langbein's book is, however, out of date, and it is useful to lecture briefly
about recent developments. In recent decades, European and American systems
have been converging or growing more alike. In civil cases, America has moved a
bit toward the European model. This shift can be seen in enhanced pretrial judicial
case management, in the trial and pretrial procedures of the Manual for Complex
Litigation,9 and in the use of court-annexed arbitration and other alternative dispute
8 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997).
9 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995).
1998]
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resolution techniques.°
In criminal cases, however, the convergence has proceeded almost entirely
from the European side. At least in Germany, the criminal trial is longer and more
adversarial than it was when Langbein wrote, and partly as a result, Germany can
no longer be described in the way that Langbein described it in an article published
a few years after his course materials. That nation is no longer a "land without plea
bargaining."'1
Recent developments in Germany and elsewhere support an empirical
proposition that I advanced almost twenty years ago, mostly on the basis of our own
historical experience: "[T]he more formal and elaborate the trial process, the more
likely it is that this process will be subverted through pressures for self-
incrimination. The simpler and more straightforward the trial process, the more
likely it is that the process will be used."' 2
Of course substantial differences between European and American criminal
procedure remain. Certainly nothing resembling the O.J. Simpson trial could have
occurred in any European system. 3 One significant difference is the greater
willingness of European courts to consider probative evidence without regard to its
supposed prejudicial impact and to permit witnesses to tell their stories fully.
Paradoxically, the process of excluding evidence makes American trials vastly
longer and more complicated than they would be if more relevant evidence could
be heard.
One reason people were mortified by the Simpson trial was that the
presiding judge took the American law of evidence seriously (more seriously than
judges usually do). In this trial, there were more than 16,000 evidentiary objections,
10 See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of.Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1808 (1986).
11 See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 204 (1979). For English-language descriptions of later developments, see Thomas Swenson,
The German "Plea Bargaining" Debate, 7 PACE INr'L L. REV. 373 (1995); Joachim Herrmann, Models
for the Reform of Criminal Procedure in Eastern Europe: Comparative Remarks on Changes in Trial
Structure and European Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, in CRIMINAL SCIENCE IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY:
ESSAYS INHONOR OF GERHARD 0. W. MuLLER 61 (Edward M. Wise, ed., 1994); Joachim Herrmann,
Bargaining Justice -A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1992).
12 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42 (1979).
13 See Myron Moskovitz, The O.J. Inquisition: A United States Encounter with Continental
Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1121, 1140 (1995). See also William T. Pizzi,
Discovering Who We Are: An English Perspective on the Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1027
(1996).
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7,000 of which were sustained. 4 Christopher Darden's memoir reports that, with
the trial less than half over, "there had already been 430 sidebars. The jury had seen
only 41 percent of the court proceedings. We were averaging two hours of jury
presentation per day."'"
Gordon Van Kessel's contribution to this symposium discusses one reason
why European tribunals learn more of the facts than American tribunals do - their
greater use of defendants as a source of evidence. But encouraging defendants to
tell their stories is only one of many ways in which European procedure is more
open and receptive than ours.
I will conclude with a news clipping that I think captures this basic
difference in approach. It is from the Chicago Tribune:
From his hospital bed, an 81-year-old Hungarian
immigrant pointed to a picture of the man who had viciously
beaten him. Three weeks later, he died.
It was a picture of Lee Miller, who eventually was charged
with murder. But the 12 jurors who heard the case never knew that
the old man had identified Miller before he died.
Edward Gall's son and daughter, also Hungarian
immigrants, couldn't understand this.
As they waited for the jury's verdict last week, they spoke
of how unfair the criminal justice system seemed. Their father's
killer might go free, they said, because of things the jurors couldn't
hear, things just as damning as what they did hear.
Gall's children knew what the jury did not - that their
father had pointed Miller out; that one of Miller's accomplices had
named him as the killer; that Miller had a long history of violent
crime and was not just the "derelict" his lawyer said he was.
"Why can't the jury know all this?" Gall's son asked.
The answer lay in the Bill of Rights and rules of evidence
it spawned to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.
Those rules left prosecutors Nick Trutenko and Mary Ellen
Cagney with one key witness: a convicted prostitute and admitted
heroin addict.
She was Tamra Martin, 25, who testified that she set Gall
14 See Stephen A. Metz, Comment: Justice Through the Eye of a Camera: Cameras in the
Courtrooms in the United States, Canada, England, and Scotland, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 673, 677
(1996).
is CHRIsTOPHER A. DARDEN WITH JESs WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 302 (1996).
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up to be robbed. She said Gall had hired her as a prostitute and she
planned to leave his door unlocked. Miller and a second man, Tiny
Tim Gilbert, would sneak in and rob him. The old man, she said,
was never supposed to know.
But things went wrong. Miller viciously attacked Gall, she
said. She tried to pull him off, she said, then ran to Gilbert and
pleaded with him to stop Miller.
It was too late. The old man's nose, jaw and cheekbones
were broken. Both his eyes were black and a foot-long bruise ran
across his chest. He would die of the injuries several weeks after
the beating ....
During closing arguments Thursday, Miller's lawyer,
public defender Richard Scholz, told the jury that Martin was a
desperate prostitute trying to save herself by framing Miller in the
death-penalty case.
"She sold herself to Mr. Gall," Scholz said. "She sold
herself to police officers. She sold herself to these authorities and
now they're asking you to buy what she's selling...."
Gall's children shuddered. They feared the jurors wouldn't
believe Martin, and Miller would go free.
"It must be difficult for them (Gall's children) to
understand the system, especially coming from the background
they do," Scholz said after the trial. "Lee Miller had the
constitutional right to challenge the evidence against him, to have
it brought before 12 people on ajury."
Gall's son and a police officer were at Gall's side when the
old man pointed to Miller's picture. In some cases, a "dying
declaration" is allowed as evidence because "as a person
approaches death, they have no reason to lie," Scholz said.
But such a declaration is admissible only if the victim
knows that death is imminent and, in fact, does die soon. Gall
lived for three weeks after the identification....
Gall's children couldn't understand why Tiny Tim Gilbert
wasn't forced to face the jury. He earlier told police that he helped
plan the robbery and that Miller killed Gall....
The jury also knew nothing of Miller's record. He had a
conviction for attempted murder in 1976 and an armed robbery
conviction in 1973, said Trutenko. In 1983, while free on bond in
the Gall case, he was arrested and convicted of burglary in Indiana.
He escaped from prison there, went to California and was arrested
and convicted of a sexual assault and robbery.
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"Why don't they tell the jury this?" Gall's son asked. But
a past criminal record cannot be used as evidence unless the
defendant takes the witness stand, because it would unfairly bias
the jurors against a defendant who is presumed innocent until
proved guilty. A criminal background can be used only to help
determine the credibility, not the guilt, of a witness.
Miller didn't take the stand. As far as the jury knew, he
was a 35-year-old "derelict" ....
The lawyers' closing arguments covered the sparse
circumstantial evidence but centered on Martin.
"Tamra Martin is trying to avoid the death penalty....
She has every reason in the world to lie," Scholz told the jury.
"Please don't buy what Tamra Martin has to say. Please."...
The jurors were out for two hours. They, came back with
the verdict: guilty. Gall's daughter cried tears of relief, and his son
smiled. Maybe this country's justice system isn't so bad after all,
they said. 6
Perhaps, as the victim's children concluded, our criminal justice system
isn't so bad. Or perhaps what Rudolph Schlesinger wrote twenty-one years ago is
even more true today: "[W]hen it comes to problems of criminal procedure,
[American lawyers] are possessed by a feeling of superiority that seems to grow in
direct proportion to the ever-increasing weight of the accumulating evidence
demonstrating the total failure of our system of criminal justice."'7
16 Linnet Meyers, Murder Trial Rules Baffle Victim's Kin: Justice Follows Winding Course,
CHi. TRm., Oct. 14, 1985, § 2, at 3.
17 Rudolph Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign
Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 363 (1977).
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